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The Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS): A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis

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²Department of Neurology, Vivantes Klinikum im Friedrichshain, Berlin, Germany

We meta-analytically reviewed studies that used the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) to detect feigned psychopathology. We present weighted mean diagnostic accuracy and predictive power indices in various populations, based on 31 studies, including 61 subsamples and 4009 SIMS protocols. In addition, we provide normative data of patients, claimants, defendants, nonclinical adults, and various experimental feigners, based on 41 studies, including 125 subsamples and 4810 SIMS protocols. We conclude that the SIMS (1) is able to differentiate well between instructed feigners and honest responders; (2) generates heightened scores in groups that are known to have a raised prevalence of feigning (e.g., offenders who claim crime-related amnesia); (3) may overestimate feigning in patients who suffer from schizophrenia, intellectual disability, or psychogenic non-epileptic seizures; and (4) is fairly robust against coaching. The diagnostic power of the traditional cut scores of the SIMS (i.e., > 14 and > 16) is not so much limited by their sensitivity—which is satisfactory—but rather by their substandard specificity. This, however, can be worked around by combining the SIMS with other symptom validity measures and by raising the cut score, although the latter solution sacrifices sensitivity for specificity.

Keywords: Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology; Symptom validity; Malingering; Response bias; Psychopathology.

INTRODUCTION

In 1997 Smith and Burger introduced their Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS). Its name is misleading, but clearly reveals the ambition of the authors: The SIMS aims to detect feigned psychopathology. Its construction was guided by the idea that naïve respondents are likely to endorse bizarre, rare, atypical, or extreme symptoms on a questionnaire when they attempt to feign or exaggerate symptoms. Thus, the SIMS presents patients, claimants, defendants, or research participants with a list of 75 implausible symptoms or statements that are to be endorsed or rejected.

The SIMS covers a broad spectrum of pseudopsychopathology. Its items allude to atypical depression, improbable memory problems, pseudoneurological symptoms, doubtful claims of psychotic experiences, and hyperbolic signs of mental retardation. Each of these five categories is represented by a subscale comprising 15 items. People
may endorse some items, but those who claim to suffer from an abundance of SIMS items are thought to feign psychopathology. Smith and Burger (1997) recommended a cut score of > 14 (i.e., scores exceeding 14 are considered to be positive test outcomes). The authors warned that the SIMS subscales are not suitable for detecting feigned psychopathology, and only serve to evaluate what type of psychopathology the respondent is trying to feign, once it has been established that the total SIMS score exceeds the cutoff.

In 2005, after the SIMS had been in use for a number of years, its manual was published (Widows & Smith, 2005). Studies that had employed the SIMS to that date were summarized in the manual. Boone (2013), Wisdom, Callahan, and Shaw (2010; Table 1), and Smith (2008; Table 19.3) presented qualitative reviews of studies using the SIMS. In this article we take a meta-analytical approach to the extant SIMS literature. In contrast to previous reviews, we present a meta-analysis of diagnostic accuracies and predictive powers, and offer normative data of patients, claimants, defendants, nonclinical adults, and various experimental feigners. We focus on what these data tell us about the ability of the SIMS to discriminate between feigners and honest respondents. We also discuss implications for the clinical utility of the SIMS and offer guidelines for clinical practice. Before doing so, we put the term “malingering test” (as the SIMS is often understood) into context.

Malingerers over-report pathological symptoms. They do so in a calculated attempt to obtain material gain or to escape formal duty or responsibility (see Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th ed.; DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013). However, not everyone who over-reports symptoms is a malingerer. Hence, there is no such thing as a malingering test. While a test may indicate that a person over-reports symptoms, it cannot clarify why he or she does so (see also Boone, 2007). Thus, the name of the SIMS is based on a misconception. It is more accurate to refer to the SIMS as a symptom validity test (SVT).

How proficient is the SIMS in detecting symptom over-endorsement? Several authors (e.g., Hartman, 2002) have commented on the qualities that SVTs such as the SIMS should possess. First and foremost, an SVT should differentiate accurately between honest respondents and people who are known to feign their symptoms. This requires high sensitivity (i.e., ability to identify feigners) as well as high specificity (i.e., ability to classify honest responders correctly). A second and related point is that an SVT should be sensitive to differential prevalence. That is, the SVT should generate higher scores for populations in which feigning is common, and lower scores for populations in which feigning is rare. A third requisite for SVTs is insensitivity to genuine psychopathology: Honest patients should not attain red flag scores on an SVT. A fourth quality indicator is robustness against coaching by, for example, lawyers. Other criteria stress that SVTs should be easy to administer and interpret, and that they ought to cover disabilities or symptoms that are likely targets for feigning. Ideally, an SVT resembles measures of genuine psychopathology (i.e., it should not be readily identifiable as an SVT). Lastly, the efficacy of an SVT should be based on reliable, up-to-date norms for nonclinical controls, honest patients, and known feigners (Hartman, 2002).

Below we review the SIMS literature and match the SIMS against these criteria. We conclude that while the SIMS might be a useful SVT, certain guidelines should be adopted. These include using optimal cut scores, exercising extra caution when administering the SIMS to certain clinical groups, and combining the SIMS with other SVTs.
and, ideally, with performance validity tests (PVTs), which measure underperformance in cognitive domains.

**METHOD**

Published studies that employed the SIMS were located by means of a computerized literature search with Google Scholar and EBSCO Discovery Service (PsycINFO). This search was conducted with “Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology” and “SIMS” as entries. Studies published since the introduction of the SIMS (1997) up to the writing of this article (August 2014) were inspected. In addition to Anglo-Saxon articles, Dutch, German, and Spanish papers were included. Unpublished papers (e.g., dissertations) were not considered because they are not readily accessible to readers. Accordingly, five dissertations were not included. Additional studies were identified by contacting researchers who attended the Third European Symposium on Symptom Validity Assessment (see Plohmann & Merten, 2013).

All identified studies that reported data concerning the diagnostic accuracy and/or predictive power of the SIMS in detecting symptom over-reporting were included (i.e., no exclusions were made). These studies are listed in Table 1 (known-groups studies) and Table 2 (simulation studies). Weighted mean diagnostic accuracy and predictive power indices for both known-groups and simulation studies are presented in Table 3. Table 6 gives mean SIMS scores and effect sizes, based on studies that reported mean SIMS scores. In order to test whether language had a moderating effect, all studies were coded with respect to their language background. The effect sizes shown in Table 6 were calculated by employing a single pooled standard deviation. Data were analyzed with IBM SPSS Statistics 21 and Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals (ESCI; see Cumming, 2012).

**RESULTS**

**Known-groups studies**

Table 1 summarizes SIMS data from 10 studies in which an external criterion was used to define samples of feigners and honest responders. With the exception of González Ordi, Santamaría Fernández, and Fernández Marín (2010), samples consisted of individuals who were involved in legal procedures, be it as claimants in compensation cases, as defendants in criminal procedures, or as prisoners within a penal institution. In most studies, scores on the *Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms* (SIRS; Rogers, Bagby, & Dickens, 1992) served as external criteria. The SIRS consists of 172 questions that cover multiple strategies to detect feigned psychopathology, such as absurd symptoms, unlikely combinations of symptoms, reported versus observed symptoms, and abnormal severity of symptoms. The SIRS has been well studied; the meta-analysis by Green and Rosenfeld (2011) yielded a sensitivity (i.e., the likelihood of a positive SVT result in feigners) of .49 and a specificity (i.e., likelihood of a negative SVT result in honest responders) of .95 for the SIRS.

The overall conclusion that can be drawn from Table 1 is that the SIMS is fairly effective in discriminating between feigning and honest responding groups: Effect sizes
### Table 1. Diagnostic accuracy of the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) in known-groups studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>Prevalence of feigning</th>
<th>Cutoff</th>
<th>Sensitivity</th>
<th>Specificity</th>
<th>Cohen’s d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alwes et al. (2008)</td>
<td>Claimants</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>SIRS, TOMM, VSVT, LMT</td>
<td>Psychiatric: 7%</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clegg et al. (2009)</td>
<td>Claimants</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>SIRS</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>&gt;14</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edens et al. (2007)</td>
<td>Prisoners in mental health unit</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>SIRS</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>&gt;14</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>González Ordi, Santamaría Fernández, Blasco Saiz, &amp; Pallardó Durá (2008)</td>
<td>Claimants</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>MMPI-2 (F-K \geq 50, T and F &gt; 70)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>&gt;14</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>González Ordi et al. (2010)</td>
<td>Patients on sick leave</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Independent judgment similar to Slick</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>&gt;14</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heinze &amp; Purisch (2001)</td>
<td>Defendants incompetent to stand trial</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>Clinical judgment by multidisciplinary team</td>
<td>13%&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>&gt;13</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lewis et al. (2002)</td>
<td>Defendants</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>SIRS</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vitacco et al. (2007)</td>
<td>Defendants</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>SIRS</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>&gt;14</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vossler-Thies et al. (2013)</td>
<td>Claimants</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>Slick</td>
<td>Definite: 31%</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>1.5&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisdom et al. (2010)</td>
<td>Claimants</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>Slick</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>&gt;14</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>2.0&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NR = Not reported, insufficient data to calculate. N/A = Not applicable. LMT = Letter Memory Test (Inman et al., 1998). MMPI-2 = Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–Second Edition (Butcher et al., 2001). SIRS = Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (Rogers et al., 1992). Slick = criteria for malingering as formulated by Slick, Sherman, and Iverson (1999). TOMM = Test of Memory Malingering (Tombaugh, 1996). VSVT = Victoria Symptom Validity Test (Slick, Hopp, Strauss, & Spellacy, 1996). <sup>a</sup>Based on an initial sample of 438 defendants who were found incompetent to stand trial. <sup>b</sup>Calculated using available information.
Table 2. Diagnostic accuracy of the Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) in simulation studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Experimental feigners</th>
<th>Honest responders</th>
<th>Cutoff</th>
<th>Sensitivity</th>
<th>Specificity</th>
<th>Cohen’s d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cima et al. (2003)</td>
<td>Patients</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.73</td>
<td>1.5(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undergraduates</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.0(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dandachi-FitzGerald &amp; Merckelbach (2013)</td>
<td>Undergraduates</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.2(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edens et al. (1999)</td>
<td>Undergraduates</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>196(^a)</td>
<td>&gt;14</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>3.0(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edens et al. (2007)</td>
<td>Nonclinical prison inmates</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>&gt;14</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giger et al. (2010)</td>
<td>Nonclinical adults:</td>
<td>– Naïve</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>2.9(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Forewarned of SVT</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1.5(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>González Ordi, Santamaria Fernández, &amp;</td>
<td>Undergraduates</td>
<td>326(^c)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>3.0(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mataelobos Veiga (2008)</td>
<td>Undergraduates</td>
<td>326(^c)</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>&gt;14</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>3.0(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graue et al. (2007)</td>
<td>Intellectually disabled</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.5(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Matched controls</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>1.3(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jelicic et al. (2006)</td>
<td>Undergraduates:</td>
<td>– Naïve</td>
<td>15(^b)</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.2(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Clinical knowledge</td>
<td>15(^b)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.0(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Knowledge + forewarned</td>
<td>15(^b)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2.6(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>(45)</td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>(.91)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(2.9)(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jelicic et al. (2011)</td>
<td>Undergraduates:</td>
<td>– Clinical knowledge</td>
<td>29(^b)</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.0(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Knowledge + forewarned</td>
<td>28(^b)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.2(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>(.89)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(3.1)(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jelicic, Merckelbach, et al. (2007)</td>
<td>Undergraduates:</td>
<td>– Naïve</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>&gt;14</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.8(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Knowledge + forewarned</td>
<td>30(^b)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>&gt;14</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2.3(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jelicic, Peters, et al. (2007)</td>
<td>Undergraduates:</td>
<td>– Naïve</td>
<td>30(^a)</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.1(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>– Clinical knowledge</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31(^a)</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.4(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jelicic et al. (2013)</td>
<td>Clinical experts</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23(^a)</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.4(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Undergraduates</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24(^a)</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.7(d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merckelbach &amp; Collaris (2012)</td>
<td>Undergraduates:</td>
<td>– Naïve</td>
<td>15(^b)</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>2.1(d)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Experimental feigners</th>
<th>Honest responders</th>
<th>Cutoff</th>
<th>Sensitivity</th>
<th>Specificity</th>
<th>Cohen's $d$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merten et al. (2008)</td>
<td>Nonclinical adults:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Naïve</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Forewarned of SVT</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merten et al. (2010)</td>
<td>Nonclinical adults:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Naïve</td>
<td>20$^b$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Clinical knowledge</td>
<td>20$^b$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Forewarned of SVT</td>
<td>20$^b$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Knowledge + forewarned</td>
<td>20$^b$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>(80)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(.84)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peters et al. (2013)</td>
<td>Schizophrenia patients</td>
<td>–</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.71</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>1.3$^d$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Nonclinical controls</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogers et al. (1996)</td>
<td>Forensic patients:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Malingering</td>
<td>17$^b$</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td></td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>1.3$^d$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Factitious, Demanding</td>
<td>18$^b$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td></td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>1.1$^d$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Factitious, Dependent</td>
<td>14$^b$</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td></td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>0.9$^d$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Total)</td>
<td>(49)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td></td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>(1.1)$^d$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rogers et al. (2014)</td>
<td>Inpatient trauma victims</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smith &amp; Burger (1997)</td>
<td>Undergraduates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vossler-Thies et al. (2013)</td>
<td>Nonclinical adults</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimmermann et al. (2013)</td>
<td>Military patients</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>3.4$^d$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NR = Not reported, insufficient data to calculate. N/A = Not applicable. $^a$Within-participants (i.e., test–retest) design. $^b$The difference in mean SIMS scores between these groups was not statistically significant ($p > .05$). $^c$The data of this group were employed by both González Ordi and Santamaría Fernández (2008) and González Ordi, Santamaría Fernández, and Matalobos Veiga (2008). $^d$Calculated using available information.
The sensitivity for the commonly employed cutoffs (i.e., > 14 and > 16) is adequate, ranging from .75 to 1.00. The corresponding specificity rates are highly divergent (range: .37 to .93), yet often alarmingly low; a serious point to which we will return below.

### Simulation studies

Table 2 provides an overview of 24 simulation studies. Samples consisted predominantly of undergraduate students. In the majority of these studies participants were either asked to feign psychopathology or to respond honestly. In the feigning conditions participants were typically presented with a case vignette describing an individual with a salient and strong motive to feign pathological symptoms. Before being administered the SIMS, participants were prompted to identify with the main character in the case scenario and were asked to feign psychiatric or cognitive symptoms convincingly.
In most studies participants feigned symptoms on the basis of their own naïve views. However, some studies employed conditions in which participants were informed about genuine and noncredible symptoms. Still other studies recruited participants who already possessed such knowledge by virtue of their professional or psychiatric background. A number of studies explicitly added a warning about validity tests and information about the rationale behind tests such as the SIMS. Providing participants with such technical information amounts to *coaching*, an issue that we will consider below.

The general conclusion that can be drawn from Table 2 is, again, that the SIMS does a reasonably good job in differentiating between experimental feigners and honest responders: Effect sizes (Cohen’s *d*) vary between .5 and 4.7. The range of effect sizes is remarkably wide. This is in large part due to differences in type of control groups. Some studies employed patients as controls (e.g., González Ordi & Santamaría Fernández, 2008; Graue et al., 2007; Peters, Jelicic, Moritz, Hausschildt, & Jelinek, 2013), whereas others resorted to nonclinical controls. This variety in symptomatological levels will have contributed to differences in SIMS scores between control groups. Additionally, some conditions may render patients particularly susceptible to produce raised SIMS scores (e.g., intellectual disability; Graue et al., 2007; see below).

As can be seen in Table 6 later, nonclinical controls tend to produce significantly lower SIMS scores than patient controls, meaning that the SIMS is sensitive to genuine psychopathology. This inflates effect sizes and specificity values (see also Table 3). In nonclinical control groups specificity rates of commonly used cutoffs (i.e., > 14 and > 16) vary from .88 to 1.00, whereas in patient controls they range from .23 to .83. Compared with specificity rates, sensitivity rates are more satisfactory and less diverse across studies. Table 2 lists sensitivity rates for simulation studies, which ranged from .87 to 1.00 for naïve (i.e., *noncoached*) groups.

**Robustness against coaching**

Several studies tested whether the sensitivity of the SIMS to detect feigning is undermined by knowledge about psychopathology and/or advise to beware of symptom validity testing. These studies are also listed in Table 2, and their accumulated data are displayed in Table 3.

The general finding is that being knowledgeable about psychopathology does little to undermine the sensitivity of the SIMS. In contrast, forewarning of symptom validity testing or advice against excessive feigning undermines sensitivity: When individuals were forewarned about SVTs, a cut score of > 16 yielded a sensitivity of only .72. Furthermore, clinical knowledge interacts significantly with forewarning, but in a counterintuitive way. That is, knowledge about psychopathology reduces the sensitivity-undermining effect of forewarning by approximately one third.

The SIMS attempts to detect over-reporting of psychopathology, which is radically different from the type of symptom validity assessed by PVTs. PVTs such as the Amsterdam Short-Term Memory test (ASTM; Schagen, Schmand, de Sterke, & Lindeboom, 1997), the Test of Memory Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996), and the Word Memory Test (WMT; Green, 2003) focus on cognitive dysfunction and measure underperformance on cognitive tests. Nonetheless, SIMS scores are significantly elevated in groups that are instructed to feign cognitive deficits. For example, the SIMS
attained a higher sensitivity than the ASTM among respondents who were coached and asked to feign cognitive impairment (detection rates of .90 and .70, respectively; Jelicic, Merckelbach, Candel, & Geraerts, 2007). The sensitivity of the SIMS matched that of the ASTM in a study on the effects of forewarning among experimental feigners of cognitive dysfunction (Giger, Merten, Merckelbach, & Oswald, 2010). In addition, Jelicic, Ceunen, Peters, and Merckelbach (2011) found the SIMS to be as sensitive as the TOMM when coached feigners simulated cognitive problems (detection rates of .87 and .86, respectively). In a simulation study by Merten, Diederich, and Stevens (2008), the SIMS was more sensitive in detecting feigned whiplash injury symptoms than the WMT. Yet, in forewarned participants it showed a drop of .31 in detection rate, while the WMT was largely resistant against forewarning. Moreover, 69% of research participants were able to identify the SIMS as an instrument that assesses symptom validity, as opposed to 56% who were able to identify the WMT as such (Merten et al., 2008). In another study, however, only 16% of the participants suspected the SIMS to be a measure of symptom validity, while 28% voiced such suspicion about the WMT (Merten, Lorenz, & Schlatow, 2010).

These divergent findings illustrate that estimates of sensitivity, transparency, and robustness against coaching depend on the experimental procedures that participants are subjected to. The sensitivity of the SIMS to feigned cognitive dysfunction might be largely due to the tendency of some feigners to overgeneralize and simulate psychopathology in addition to cognitive deficits. However, except for low intelligence, the SIMS does not address specific feigned cognitive deficits. Thus, regardless of its potential sensitivity, the SIMS cannot be relied upon to detect feigned cognitive impairment.

### Diagnostic accuracy

Table 3 shows weighted mean diagnostic accuracy and predictive power of the SIMS for known-groups research (Table 1) and simulation studies (Table 2). Table 3 allows for the following conclusions. To begin with, using a cut score of > 14 (as recommended by Smith & Burger, 1997) results in a sensitivity that circles around .97. Even when the cutoff is raised to > 16, the sensitivity of the SIMS to detect feigned symptoms, such as displayed by defendants attempting to feign insanity or incompetency to stand trial, remains excellent (i.e., above .90). The sensitivity rates in experimental feigners (Table 2) are similar to those in claimants (Table 1). This suggests that experimental feigners are a valid model for claimants and defendants who feign symptoms; a point that is further elaborated upon below.

Second, specificity rates in samples of honest patients, claimants, and defendants using cut scores of > 14 and > 16 varied extensively (.37 to .70) and indicate that the SIMS can yield high false positive rates in these groups (i.e., misclassify honest responders as feigners). Specificity rates in groups of nonclinical controls are high, but not perfect, which is disappointing given that these respondents presumably do neither feign nor experience any form of psychopathology. The marked difference in specificity rates between clinical and nonclinical controls underscores the importance of employing samples of honest patients, claimants, or defendants as control groups when estimating diagnostic accuracy indices of SVTs.

Third, although some studies found that control patients with psychotic symptoms score relatively low on the SIMS (e.g., Vitacco, Rogers, Gabel, & Munizza,
other studies noted that the diagnostic accuracy of the SIMS appears to be limited in patients with schizophrenia (Peters et al., 2013) and individuals who suffer from psychogenic non-epileptic seizures (Benge et al., 2012) or intellectual disability (Graue et al., 2007). The nontrivial proportion of patients with scores above the cutoff suggests that the lack of specificity is overly pronounced in these clinical groups.

Estimates of the diagnostic accuracy of the SIMS are dependent on the criteria that are employed to compose groups of feigners and honest responders. The majority of known-groups studies employed the SIRS as sole external criterion, but this instrument possesses suboptimal sensitivity. Because of this, groups of honest responders may contain a substantial proportion of false negatives (i.e., feigners who are erroneously classified as honest responders; on average 51%; Green & Rosenfeld, 2011). This may lead to an overestimation of the sensitivity of the SIMS (because the SIMS is not faulted for failing to label false negatives of the SIRS as hits) and an underestimation of specificity (as the SIMS is considered to be incorrect when it does identify false negatives of the SIRS as hits).

A related problem with using the SIRS as a criterion is the similarity in detection strategies between the SIMS and the SIRS. Both instruments focus on the endorsement of bizarre, extreme, or atypical symptoms, which is reflected in the significant correlations between the SIMS and the SIRS (e.g., r = .54, Freeman, Powell, & Kimbrell, 2008; and r = .81, Edens, Poythress, & Watkins-Clay, 2007). Thus, the diagnostic errors of the SIMS may mirror those of the SIRS, which might lead to an overestimation of the diagnostic accuracy of the SIMS.

**Predictive power**

Diagnostic accuracy (i.e., sensitivity and specificity) is only one part of the equation that describes the efficacy of a diagnostic instrument. The other part is predictive power, which depends on both diagnostic accuracy and the prior probability (i.e., prevalence, or base rate) of test results. Where diagnostic accuracy denotes the probability of a certain test outcome given the true status of an individual, predictive power refers to the probability of the true status of an individual given a certain test outcome. Thus, the practical implications of particular SIMS cutoffs cannot be evaluated without taking the base rate of feigning into account.

Table 3 shows predictive power for base rates of 10%, 30%, and 50%. Higher base rates lead to greater positive predictive power (i.e., probability of feigning if SVT outcome is positive) for a given cutoff, whereas lower base rates lead to a greater negative predictive power (i.e., probability of honest responding if SVT outcome is negative). The negative predictive power for cut scores of > 14 and > 16 is excellent, even at base rates of up to 50%. That is, the likelihood that an individual does not feign symptoms if his or her SIMS score remains below the cutoff is very high. What is more, negative predictive power decreases only slightly as base rate increases, especially if a cutoff of > 14 is employed. On the other hand, the likelihood that an individual feigns symptoms if his or her SIMS score exceeds the cutoff varies considerably depending on the base rate of feigning in his or her population. Overall, the positive predictive power for cut scores of > 14 and also > 16 is rather low, and drops
quickly as base rates fall. This implies that in populations where feigning is rare, the probability of false-positive identifications is high, even when a cut score of > 16 is employed. Note that positive predictive power is markedly higher among nonclinical respondents than in patient populations. As said earlier, the SIMS is sensitive to genuine psychopathology, and can overestimate feigning in patients.

**Sensitivity to differential prevalence**

Table 4 provides an overview of five studies that employed a differential design to explore the qualities of the SIMS. The samples vary from neurological patients and fibromyalgia litigants to prisoners who claim crime-related amnesia. The idea that feigned psychopathology is more prevalent among patients who report psychogenic complaints than among patients with neurological symptoms is *prima facie* plausible. The same holds for the assumption that feigning is more common among defendants who claim crime-related amnesia than it is among defendants without such claims. Similarly, it is safe to assume that feigning occurs more frequently among litigants than among nonlitigants.

Table 4 illustrates that the mean SIMS score of litigants is substantially higher than that of nonlitigating patients (Capilla Ramírez, González Ordi, & Santamaría Fernández, 2008). Furthermore, SIMS scores above the cutoff are more prevalent in samples of patients with psychogenic complaints or crime-related amnesia by an average factor of 4.9 in comparison to relevant control groups. Taken together, the data suggest that the SIMS is sensitive to differential prevalence. Moreover, this sensitivity seems to manifest itself more strongly as the cutoff is raised (Benge et al., 2012).

**Correlations with clinical scales and other SVTs**

Table 5 lists Pearson product–moment correlations between SIMS scores and scores on other psychological instruments. It warrants the following conclusions. First, respondents who endorse many symptoms on the SIMS also report many symptoms on standard clinical inventories: There are moderate correlations (*rs* = .50 to .72) between the SIMS and symptom measures such as the Symptom Checklist-90 Revised (SCL-90-R; Derogatis, 1994) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961).

Second, the correlations between the SIMS and PVTs (ASTM; Schagen et al., 1997; Morel Emotional Numbing Test, MENT; Morel, 1998; WMT; Green, 2003) are weak to moderate (*rs* vary from .22 to .49). Assessment of symptom validity should ideally include multiple SVTs, and preferably SVTs that are independent (i.e., correlate weakly with each other; Larrabee, 2008, 2014; Victor, Boone, Serpa, Buehler, & Ziegler, 2009). With this in mind, the correlations listed in Table 5 suggest that the combination of SIMS and ASTM is less redundant compared with that of SIMS and WMT.

A final point is the interpretation of SIMS scores that exceed the cutoff. In the studies listed in Tables 4 and 5, two extremes can be found. Some authors employ the SIMS as a definitive malingering test and treat scores above the cutoff as conclusive evidence of feigned psychopathology (e.g., Kunst, Winkel, & Bogaerts, 2011). Others
consider heightened SIMS scores to be a manifestation of somatization (e.g., Benge et al., 2012). Both interpretations are questionable. The first position is dubious because heightened SIMS scores do not necessarily reflect malingering. Elevated SIMS scores may also signal feigned psychopathology as found in factitious disorder or they might be the result of yea-saying to the test items. Such irrelevant responding can stem from frustration, boredom, defiance, or fatigue, without flagging feigning per se (see Meade & Craig, 2012).

The second interpretation assumes that somatoform disorders are superordinate in relation to feigning. There is no empirical evidence for this assumption, and the opposite idea—intentional feigning eventually contributing to somatoform symptoms—can be defended equally forcefully (Merten & Merckelbach, 2013; see also Rogers, Jackson, & Kaminski, 2005).

**SIMS subscales**

Feigning may take on many forms. One advantage of the SIMS is that it comprises five non-overlapping subscales that cover diverse types of pseudopsychopathology: Psychosis, Neurological Impairment, Amnestic Disorders, Low Intelligence, and Affective Disorders. However, the diagnostic accuracy indices of these subscales are inferior to that of the SIMS total score. Among various experimental samples, the original cutoffs of the subscales produced sensitivity rates between .66 and 1.00 and

### Table 4. Differential prevalence of Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) scores in clinical and forensic samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Samples</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Cutoff</th>
<th>Prevalence of SIMS scores beyond cutoff</th>
<th>Mean SIMS scores</th>
<th>Cohen’s d</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benge et al. (2012)</td>
<td>Patients with psychogenic non-epileptic seizures</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Patients with epileptic seizures</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(&gt;19)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(&gt;19)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cima &amp; van Oorsouw (2013)</td>
<td>Prisoners claiming crime-related amnesia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-amnestic prisoners</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen et al. (2011)</td>
<td>Successful versus unsuccessful placebo-induced seizures in patients with psychogenic non-epileptic seizures</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>&gt;14</td>
<td>Successful: 80%¹</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>NR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unsuccessful: 33%¹</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capilla Ramírez et al. (2008)</td>
<td>Fibromyalgia claimants</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chronic pain claimants</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chronic pain nonclaimants</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>NR</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Beilen et al. (2009)</td>
<td>Psychogenic patients</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neurological patients</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonclinical controls</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>&gt;16</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NR = Not reported, insufficient data to calculate. ¹Difference is significant at a level of p < 0.05 (two-tailed). ²Difference is significant at a level of p < 0.01 (two-tailed). ³Difference is significant at a level of p < 0.001 (two-tailed). ⁴Calculated using available information.
Specificity rates between .73 and .93, with two notable exceptions: The sensitivity of the Psychosis subscale, the lowest of which was .57 and the specificity of the Low Intelligence subscale, the lowest of which was .52 (Edens, Otto, & Dwyer, 1999; Smith & Burger, 1997). However, these diagnostic accuracy rates are based on nonclinical controls and therefore overestimate specificity values as found in clinical samples.

The sensitivity of the subscales seems to be largely dependent on the type of symptoms that are feigned. The closer the match between the type of psychopathology a respondent tries to feign and the type of pseudopsychopathology that a subscale targets, the higher the sensitivity of the subscale (Merkelbach & Smith, 2003; Smith & Burger, 1997; but see Edens et al., 1999, Table 3). While the sensitivity of a SIMS subscale might thus benefit from certain contexts, it rarely exceeds that of the SIMS total score. Subscales that attain high sensitivity when confronted with their target psychopathology are Affective Disorders, Neurological Impairment, and Amnestic Disorders (Benge et al., 2012; Clegg, Fremouw, & Mogge, 2009; Giger et al., 2010). The Low Intelligence subscale remains relatively insensitive to explicit attempts to mimic poor intellectual abilities (Clegg et al., 2009).

### Table 5. Pearson product–moment correlation coefficients between Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) scores and scores of other instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Samples</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Prevalence of feigning</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Correlation with SIMS</th>
<th>Shared variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cima &amp; van Oorsouw (2013)</td>
<td>Prisoners claiming crime-related amnesia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>PPI</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-amnestic prisoners</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dandachi-FitzGerald et al. (2011)</td>
<td>Psychiatric outpatients</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>ASTM</td>
<td>–.22&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edens et al. (2007)</td>
<td>Prisoners in mental health unit</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>SIRS</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Veterans with PTSD</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>SIRS</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunst et al. (2011)</td>
<td>Claimants victim services</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merten, Friedel, Mehren, &amp; Stevens (2007)</td>
<td>Claimants workers’ compensation</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>BDI</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WMT</td>
<td>–.44&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merten, Thies, Schneider, &amp; Stevens (2009)</td>
<td>Claimants workers’ compensation</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>MENT</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>WMT</td>
<td>–.49&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>van Beilen et al. (2009)</td>
<td>Psychogenic patients</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>SCL-90-R</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neurological patients</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonclinical controls</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>Not significant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (taken to be measures of internal consistency, but see Sijtsma, 2009) of the subscales depend on sample characteristics. Smith and Burger (1997) obtained alpha coefficients ranging from .80 to .86 in a sample in which the majority (87%) was instructed to feign symptoms (N = 476 undergraduates), whereas Merckelbach and Smith (2003) found coefficients that varied between .24 (Low Intelligence) and .59 (Affective Disorders) in a sample where the majority (81%) was asked to respond honestly (N = 298 undergraduates). Alpha values are higher in feigning than in honest conditions; a pattern that is also evident in the data reported by Rogers, Robinson, and Gillard (2014). The influence of sample characteristics is further illustrated by the discrepancies between the results of Merckelbach and Smith (2003) and Vitacco et al. (2007; N = 100 competency to stand trial patients, 21% malingering). The alpha coefficients for the Affective Disorders subscale in these studies were .59 and .61, respectively. Yet in the former study it was the highest coefficient for subscales, while in the latter it was the lowest. Poor alphas for the Affective Disorders subscale (.31–.37) were also found by Rogers et al. (2014) in their clinical samples. Studies uniformly find that the alpha coefficients of the subscales are lower than that of the total scale, which is to be expected given that internal reliability is a function of item number. The internal consistency of the SIMS total scale is generally satisfactory (e.g., α = .80 in Cima et al., 2003; .72 in Merckelbach & Smith, 2003; .92–.94 in Rogers et al., 2014; and .96 in Vitacco et al., 2007).

All in all, the subscales do not lend themselves to detect feigned psychopathology. Still, the subscales are sensitive enough to their target psychopathology to justify qualitative use (i.e., tentative assessment of the type of psychopathology that a person is trying to feign, once it has been established that the total score exceeds the cutoff), as originally proposed by Smith and Burger (1997).

The SIMS covers a wide variety of (spurious) psychopathology. Nonetheless, it exhibits sufficient internal consistency (e.g., Vitacco et al., 2007). This might reflect a common strategy among feigners—the tendency to overgeneralize when reporting symptoms. Studies involving experimental feigners typically find that, in spite of instructions to feign specific symptoms, participants are inclined to overgeneralize and report a diversity of symptoms (e.g., Giger et al., 2010; Merten et al., 2010).

Clegg et al. (2009) noted that experimental feigners who were instructed to feign depression and patients who were suspected of feigning a mood disorder were just as likely to fail the SIMS as they were to fail the Affective Disorders subscale. This finding illustrates three related points: Experimental feigners are comparable to real-world feigners; feigners are prone to overgeneralizing when reporting symptoms; and the accuracy of the subscales of the SIMS is at best equal to its total score.

A study by Rogers et al. (2005) suggests that subscales might be useful to discriminate between malingering and factitious disorder. In their simulation experiment, these authors instructed undergraduates to role-play individuals who feign symptoms for financial reasons or individuals who feign for intrapsychic reasons (e.g., medical attention). Those with the first set of instructions (malingering condition) were found to score particularly high on the Neurological Impairment subscale (N), whereas those with the second set of instructions (factitious condition) scored especially high on the Affective Disorders subscale (AF). Rogers et al. (2005) concluded that the AF minus N index might provide a basis for differentiating between the two types of feigning. Obviously, this interesting finding needs independent replication.
Another promising development is the attempt by Rogers and co-workers (2014) to design new SIMS subscales that are based on the established detection strategies of rare symptoms (RS) and unlikely symptom combinations (SC). Rogers and colleagues employed a simulation design in an inpatient sample and found the RS and SC scales to produce very large\(^1\) effect sizes: Cohen’s \(d\)s of 2.0 and 1.6, respectively.

### Aggregated data

An analysis of the effect of language on SIMS scores revealed that Dutch non-clinical controls score lower than English, German, and Spanish nonclinical controls (weighted means of 4.7 and 7.6, respectively; \(p < .001\), two tailed; \(d = −.8\)). We have no plausible explanation for this finding, but it means that data generated by Dutch non-clinical controls might not generalize well to other cultures. In all other groups, language effects are absent (\(p s > .05\)). Therefore, the results of these groups were pooled in Table 6. This table aggregates the data of 41 studies—comprising 125 subsamples and 4810 SIMS protocols\(^2\)—in which mean SIMS scores are reported. Table 6 shows weighted means, standard deviations, Cohen’s \(d\)s when various samples are compared to the pooled scores of honest patients, claimants, and defendants, the corresponding 95% confidence intervals for \(d\)s, and the overlap of score distributions that the \(d\)s imply. This overlap is an upper bound estimate of the diagnostic accuracy of the SIMS: The smaller the overlap between scores of feigners and honest patients, the higher the potential diagnostic accuracy.

It can be argued that studies involving experimental feigners are of little use because such feigners have other motives than real-world feigners. Moreover, the outcomes of experimental feigning research depend highly on the specific procedures employed in a study, such as quality and elaboration of the scenario with which participants are instructed (Nies & Sweet, 1994; Merckelbach, Smeets, & Jelicic, 2009). Still, experimental feigners might serve as a proxy for feigners in a real-world situation. For instance, Brennan and Gouvier (2006) and Clegg et al. (2009) contrasted experimental feigners with feigning claimants. Neither study found significant differences between the SIMS scores of both groups. A similar correspondence between SIMS scores of experimental and real-life feigners was evident in the preliminary findings of Santamaria Fernández (2013). The data displayed in Table 6 corroborate the overlap between SIMS scores of experimental feigners and at least some categories of real-world feigners. As can be seen, SIMS scores of experimental feigners fall within a range that is typical for feigning defendants.

In contrast to experimental feigners, experimental honest responders (i.e., nonclinical controls) are poor substitutes for their real-world counterparts:\(^3\) Table 6 shows that

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\(^1\)We followed the recommendation of Rogers et al. (2005) for the qualification of effect sizes: moderate (\(≥ .75\)), large (\(≥ 1.25\)), and very large (\(≥ 1.50\)).

\(^2\)The data summarized in Table 6 are based on 4562 individuals who—due to within-participant (i.e., test–retest) designs—contributed 4810 SIMS protocols. The studies used are marked with * in the references.

\(^3\)Note that, in clinical practice, the SIMS will never be administered to nonclinical honest responders, because they, by definition, do not claim to suffer from psychopathology.
Table 6. Weighted means, standard deviations, Cohen’s $d^{a}$, corresponding 95% confidence intervals, and overlap between distributions$^{b}$ of Structured Inventory of Malingered Symptomatology (SIMS) scores in various samples, based on 41 studies, including 125 subsamples and 4810 SIMS protocols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Number of samples</th>
<th>Total sample size</th>
<th>Weighted mean SIMS raw score</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval of weighted mean</th>
<th>Weighted standard deviation Cohen’s $d^{a}$</th>
<th>95% Confidence interval of Cohen’s $d$</th>
<th>Overlap$^{b}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonclinical controls (English, German, Spanish)$^{f}$</td>
<td>12 d</td>
<td>648 e</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.9–9.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>–.9</td>
<td>–1.2 to –.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonclinical controls (Dutch)$^{f}$</td>
<td>19 d</td>
<td>688 e</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.5–5.9</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>–1.2</td>
<td>–1.5 to –.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest patients$^{e}$</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>13.4–18.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest claimants</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11.9–15.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honest defendants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>10.9–15.5</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feigning claimants</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>20.4–27.0</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8 to 1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feigning defendants</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>33.6–42.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.4 to 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental feigners (Psychiatric)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>31.3–40.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1 to 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental feigners (Cognitive)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>526</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>29.8–39.2</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0 to 2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental feigners (Miscellaneous)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>25.1–34.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.5 to 2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental feigners (Clinical knowledge)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>31.3–39.7</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1 to 2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental feigners (Forewarned of SVT)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>18.4–28.2</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>.7 to 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experimental feigners (Knowledge + forewarned)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>22.1–30.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1 to 1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data summarized in this table are based on 4562 individuals who—due to within-participant (i.e., test–retest) designs—contributed 4810 SIMS protocols. The studies used are marked with * in the references. $^{a}$Calculated using the weighted mean score of honest patients, claimants, and defendants. $^{b}$Overlap between the distributions of scores of the specified populations and the scores of honest patients, claimants, and defendants. $^{c}$The honesty of the vast majority of these patients is assumed, but not established by symptom validity testing. $^{d}$Including 1 within-participants (i.e., test–retest) sample. $^{e}$Including 24 within-participants (i.e., test–retest) SIMS protocols. $^{f}$Aside from the significant difference ($p < .001$, two tailed. Cohen’s $d = –.8$) between Dutch nonclinical controls and English, German, and Spanish nonclinical controls, there were no significant differences between the mean scores of Dutch, English, German, and Spanish respondents to the SIMS.
honest claimants, defendants, and patients score higher than nonclinical controls. The effect size of genuine psychopathology on SIMS scores is moderate $d = .9$ in English, German, and Spanish samples; $d = 1.2$ in Dutch samples. Thus, as stated earlier, studies that rely on nonclinical controls overestimate the specificity and positive predictive power of the SIMS.

Table 6 also reveals that feigning claimants score significantly lower than feigning defendants ($d = 1.1$ vs. $d = 2.8$). The overlap between the distributions of SIMS scores of honest and feigning claimants is 41%, whereas the overlap between scores of honest and feigning defendants is only 9%. This suggests that the diagnostic accuracy of the SIMS is better in criminal law settings than in civil law settings. Feigning defendants usually aim for reduced criminal responsibility, which arguably requires more radical symptoms than the typical disability that is needed for the compensation that claimants commonly seek.

Another conclusion that can be drawn from Table 6 is that experimental feigners who feign psychiatric symptoms produce total SIMS scores that are similar to those of experimental feigners who fake cognitive deficits ($d = 2.5$ vs. $d = 2.4$; overlap of 12% and 13%, respectively). This implies that the sensitivity of the SIMS to feigned cognitive deficits is roughly equivalent to its sensitivity to feigned psychiatric symptoms.

In the majority of experimental studies, participants were explicitly asked to feign certain types of symptoms (i.e., either cognitive or psychiatric symptoms). Samples in which it was left to the participants to decide which type of psychopathology they would attempt to feign are brought together in Table 6 under the caption “Experimental feigners (Miscellaneous)”. The greater freedom to choose which type of symptoms to feign has a mitigating effect on SIMS scores of experimental feigners: It reduces the effect of experimental feigning ($d$) from 2.5 to 1.8.

Furthermore, Table 6 confirms that SIMS scores of experimental feigners can be subdued considerably by forewarning of symptom validity testing ($d$ drops from 2.5 to 1.0), but not by relevant knowledge about psychopathology ($d$ remains 2.5). However large the effect of forewarning, it still falls short of enabling coached feigners to produce scores that fall completely within the range of honest claimants and patients. More specifically, forewarning increases the overlap between distributions of SIMS scores of experimental feigners and honest patients from approximately 13% to 45%. Also evident from Table 6 is that the effects of forewarning and relevant clinical knowledge do not interact to produce a greater moderating effect on SIMS scores of feigners. As mentioned before, clinical knowledge curbs the effect of forewarning on the sensitivity of the SIMS.

**DISCUSSION**

**Limitations of the SIMS**

Despite its solid internal consistency and broad coverage of (bogus) psychopathology, the SIMS suffers from several limitations. These are inherent to the rationale behind its construction. Smith and Burger (1997) developed the SIMS for the purpose

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$^4$Calculated by contrasting the weighted mean SIMS score of nonclinical respondents with that of honest patients, claimants, and defendants.
of forensic screening. As a consequence, the SIMS covers a number of extreme dysfunctions (in particular with regard to claimed mental retardation and amnestic syndrome) that defendants might feign in the context of, for example, pleas of diminished criminal responsibility. However, such extremes will have lower base rates outside criminal settings. Milder, less disabling cognitive impairments are not addressed by the SIMS items. Therefore, the sensitivity of the SIMS might be limited in civil forensic assessment, where claims of moderate or even mild impairment are much more common.

A related point is that the SIMS items focus mainly on bizarre and atypical symptoms (but see below for exceptions). This capitalization on bizarre symptoms renders the SIMS readily recognizable as an SVT, (e.g., Merten et al., 2008). More importantly, the lack of alternative (i.e., other than pseudosymptom) items constrains the diagnostic possibilities of the SIMS. The absence of items that cover genuine symptoms makes it difficult to determine whether heightened SIMS scores might be potentially related to genuine psychopathology. Similarly, without control items it is not possible to identify irrelevant response patterns such as indiscriminate affirmation or rejection of items (resulting from, e.g., recalcitrance or indifference). Thus, its exclusive reliance on pseudopsychopathology prevents the SIMS from differentiating between feigning and aberrant test behavior.

The presence of genuine symptoms within SIMS subscales is a fourth shortcoming. The Affective Disorders subscale has been criticized particularly for this reason (Widder, 2011). Illustrative examples of moot items from this subscale are items #32 (“I have trouble …”) and #52 (“I do not seem …”). The overlap of this subscale with genuine depressive symptoms might bias honest patients toward the cutoff. For example, Kobelt, Göbber, Bassler, and Petermann (2012) found that the prevalence of SIMS failure (i.e., SIMS total score > 16) among patients with depression was disproportionately high relative to other clinical groups (57% vs. 4–24%).

There are other SIMS items that might tap into genuine psychopathology, notably items #15 (memory problems), #20 (head injury), and #44 (tinnitus). Furthermore, Widder (2011) opined that items #5 (changed taste of food), #6 (laughing rarely), #10 (changing body shape), #43 (difficulties maintaining sleep), and #66 (being inactive) might reflect genuine psychopathology.

Another source of measurement error might be the wording of some items: In particular item #65 (“When I hear …”), which contains a double negation, is difficult to understand for some persons. As well, item #21 (“There are six …”) is strictly speaking logically correct reasoning, although endorsing it would count as an indication for feigning. This item is of the “there-are-living-100-people-in-the-US” type. One could imagine an autistic patient with a tendency toward concretism endorsing this item. A better way of formulating this type of item would be, “There are exactly 100 people living in the US”.

An asset of the SIMS is its low comprehension difficulty; it does not require a high reading level (i.e., Flesch-Kincaid Scale 5.3 suffices; Smith, 2008). Nevertheless, in a sample of nonclinical controls (N = 100), SIMS scores were found to be slightly dependent on verbal intelligence (B = 0.11, R² = .18, p < .05), but not on age, sex, or education (although the dependence on education was significant when verbal intelligence was not controlled for; Giger & Merten, 2013). Indeed, the SIMS has yielded low specificity rates among individuals with intellectual disability and care is warranted.
in making determinations of feigning in this group based on the traditional cutoffs. It
could be that individuals with intellectual disability produce heightened SIMS scores
because of their diminished capacity to comprehend SIMS items. However, it might
also be that low intelligence predisposes individuals to engage in more transparent
forms of feigning (e.g., Solomon et al., 2010).

A limitation of the literature on the SIMS is the lack of test–retest reliability data.
The stability of SIMS scores over time has been assessed only in small, nonclinical
control samples. Merckelbach and Smith (2003) gave the Dutch version of the SIMS
twice to 24 female undergraduate students, using a 3-week test interval. They obtained
a test–retest correlation coefficient of .72, which can be regarded as satisfactory. Cima
and colleagues (2003) administered the German version of the SIMS to 18 undergraduates
(14 men, 4 women) twice, with a 6-week interval in between, and found an out-
standing test–retest correlation: .97.

**Suboptimal specificity**

When the traditional cut scores (i.e., > 14 and > 16) are employed, the SIMS
meets several requirements for a sound SVT (Hartman, 2002): Its hit rate (sensitivity) is
acceptable; it is sensitive to differential prevalence; and it is robust against coaching.
These qualities generalize across gender (e.g., Alwes, Clark, Berry, & Granacher, 2008;
Wisdom et al., 2010), race (Edens et al., 2007; Vitacco et al., 2007), and language (i.e.,
Dutch: Merckelbach & Smith, 2003; German: Cima et al., 2003; and Spanish: González
Ordi & Santamaría Fernández, 2009). In addition, the SIMS is relatively easy to admin-
ister and interpret, and it measures a wide range of symptoms that are likely targets for
feigning (see Dandachi-FitzGerald & Merckelbach, 2013).

However, the ability of the original SIMS cutoffs to classify honest responders
with psychopathology correctly is not satisfactory: Cut scores of > 14 and > 16 have
generally yielded low specificity rates in honest patient samples. In patients with schiz-
ophrenia, individuals with intellectual disability, and patients suffering from psychogenic
non-epileptic seizures, the SIMS generates many positive results (Benge et al., 2012;
Graue et al., 2007; Peters et al., 2013). Certain characteristics of schizophrenia, such as
deficits in reality monitoring (Radaelli, Benedetti, Cavallaro, Colombo, & Smeraldi,
2013) lack of illness insight (Shad, Tamminga, Cullum, Haas, & Keshaven, 2006), and
cognitive impairment (Schaefer, Giangrande, Weinberger, & Dickinson, 2013; but see
Stevens et al., 2014), may predispose patients to produce high SIMS scores. Similarly,
intellectual disability may contribute to heightened SIMS scores due to, for example,
deficiencies in verbal comprehension, abstract thinking, and judgment (American
Psychiatric Association, 2013). Psychogenic disorders such as psychogenic movement
disorder and non-epileptic seizures (PNES) may involve cognitive biases (e.g., “jump-
ing to conclusions”; Paréés, Kassavetis, et al., 2012) and abnormalities in attention and
perception (Paréés, Saifee, et al., 2012) that might lead patients to experience and report
peculiar symptoms. This might explain why these patients sometimes fail on PVTs
(Drane et al., 2006; Heintz et al., 2013) and SVTs such as the SIMS (Benge et al.,
2012).

Although specific deficits inherent to schizophrenia, intellectual disability, and
psychogenic disorder can put patients at risk of generating raised SIMS scores, high
SIMS scores should not be dismissed lightly. Studies that employed the SIMS in these populations (Benge et al., 2012; Graue et al., 2007; Peters et al., 2013) did not conform to known-groups designs, which complicates the interpretation of their results. The authors of these studies noted that their patients were not involved in legal proceedings and were not bent on gaining benefits in any way. Yet, obvious external incentives are not a prerequisite for dubious scores on SVTs (e.g., Fox, 2011). Also, absence of evidence for external incentives should not be taken as evidence for the absence of such incentives. In fact, research into hidden agendas of patients drives home the point that a substantial portion of patients (up to 42%) have covert motives for obtaining secondary gains associated with their patient status (e.g., financial support, help or attention from others, stimulant medication, work or study related privileges, or evasion of responsibilities; van Egmond & Kummeling, 2002; van Egmond, Kummeling, & van Balkom, 2005).

Clinicians should be circumspect in explaining high SIMS scores as a “cry for help”: Such an interpretation might be valid, but it requires evidence that is independent from methods that rely on self-report. Furthermore, there is some evidence that feigning psychopathology is associated with reduced rather than increased treatment intensity, which runs counter to the notion of “cry for help” (Greene, 1988).

Given that the SIMS is (mainly) composed of non-genuine symptoms, it stands to reason that prominent scores (e.g., > 21) imply that respondents are either unwilling or unable to report their symptoms accurately, which means that diagnostic follow-up examinations are warranted. Just as the honesty of patients should not be discredited solely on the basis of elevated SIMS scores, so excessively raised SIMS scores should not be dismissed only because salient external incentives are absent and/or the patient has a diagnosis of, say, schizophrenia. Not only would such an approach ignore factitious motives to feign psychopathology (e.g., sympathy, attention, and care that come with the “sick role”), it would also disregard the possibility that patients may engage in feigning or exaggeration of symptoms.

Besides genuine inability and feigning, there are many reasons why patients might score above the SIMS cutoff. For example, patients might respond arbitrarily to a test in an attempt to obstruct the assessment or in order to be done with it as quickly as possible. Or they might fail to comprehend complex sentences (e.g., item #13 “There is nothing…”). Obviously, obstruction, rashness, and insufficient language comprehension bear no direct relation to feigning. Thus, the inference that a heightened SIMS score represents feigning is a secondary clinical inference; the primary clinical inference is “noncredible symptom report”. This primary inference means that other test scores and self-reports of the patient cannot be accepted at face value either. Indeed, a recurrent finding in the literature is that heightened SIMS scores explain a considerable part of other test scores (Dandachi-FitzGerald, Ponds, Peters, & Merckelbach, 2011; Merten, Friedel, & Stevens, 2007; van Beilen, Griffioen, Gross, & Leenders, 2009).

**Optimal cutoff**

In light of the considerable consequences of discrediting genuine psychopathology, the conclusion that patients, claimants, or defendants feign symptoms should only be drawn when there is solid evidence. Surely, any diagnostic decision criterion that
lacks specificity (i.e., that carries a significant false-positive risk) will have difficulties generating such evidence. The SIMS has poor specificity when cut scores of \( > 14 \) and \( > 16 \) are employed (see also Rogers et al., 2014). How problematic this is depends on the purpose for which the SIMS is utilized. When it is used as a global screening measure of symptom validity such that scores exceeding the cutoff lead to conclusive follow-up testing, suboptimal specificity is defensible. If, on the other hand, the SIMS is employed as part of a multi-method SVT battery that is utilized for conclusive assessment of feigned psychopathology, then the substandard specificity associated with cut scores of \( > 14 \) or \( > 16 \) is perilous. In that case, a cut score of \( > 19 \) (Clegg et al., 2009) or—even when more diagnostic certainty is required—\( > 24 \) (Wisdom et al., 2010) would be more appropriate. Of course, gains in specificity due to raising the cutoff come at the cost of sensitivity. Thus, setting the cutoff at \( > 19 \) or \( > 24 \) will result in safer yet fewer identifications of feigned psychopathology, such that the SIMS will only identify the most blatant forms of feigning, and hence lose its quality as a screening instrument.

Another approach would be to use a cutoff of \( > 19 \) and define a zone of less certainty as to individual classifications. Table 7 shows a tentative taxonomy. A similar procedure has been proposed by Rogers et al. (1992) for the SIRS. Its advantage is that a strict and artificial dichotomy between feigning and honest responding is avoided.

Thus, the optimal cutoff varies depending on the rationale for using the SIMS (i.e., screening versus conclusive assessment). The trade-off between the power to detect feigned psychopathology (i.e., sensitivity) and the ability to avoid false positives (i.e., specificity) forces clinicians to decide in advance whether specificity should take precedence over sensitivity. If the goal is to screen for possible cases of invalid symptom reporting, then a cut score of \( > 16 \) suffices. If, however, it is crucial to avoid false positives (as would be the case in many instances of clinical or forensic assessment), then a cut score of at least \( > 19 \) is called for. In populations with particularly heightened SIMS scores due to genuine psychopathology (e.g., schizophrenia, intellectual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cut score</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( &gt; 16 )</td>
<td>Recommended when the SIMS is employed as a screen for feigned psychopathology. Carefully investigate and possibly exclude false-positive classifications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( &gt; 19 )</td>
<td>Recommended when the SIMS is employed as part of a test battery that is utilized for conclusive assessment of feigned psychopathology. It yields lower sensitivity, but higher specificity (reduced risk of false-positive classification).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( &gt; 16 ) — ( &gt; 19 )</td>
<td>Combined cutoffs. Use scores from 17 to 19 as indicating possible feigning, or relatively mild feigning. Follow-up testing is warranted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( &gt; 24 )</td>
<td>Only recommended when the SIMS is employed as part of a test battery for conclusive assessment in populations with particularly heightened SIMS scores due to genuine psychopathology (e.g., schizophrenia, intellectual disability). It yields high specificity, but low sensitivity (high risk of false-negative classification).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Caveat</td>
<td>Heightened SIMS scores do not necessarily reflect feigned psychopathology: They might also be the result of irrelevant responding due to, for example, fatigue, frustration, indifference, defiance, or incomprehension.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
disability), cut scores of > 19 for screening and > 24 for conclusive assessment would be highly recommendable. In sum, selection of a particular cutoff should be considered carefully and in advance: The data in Table 6 and the taxonomy in Table 7 might be helpful in this regard.

**Multi-method approach**

In general, people who feign psychopathology tend to overgeneralize: They might feign both psychiatric symptoms and cognitive deficits (i.e., they might over-report symptoms and underperform on cognitive tests). Moreover, feigners of psychopathology overgeneralize to cognitive impairments more frequently than the other way around (i.e., over-reporters underperform more often than underperformers over-report; Alwes et al., 2008; see also Green, Rosenfeld, Belfi, Rohlehr, & Pierson, 2012; Heinze & Purisch, 2001). However, people might also be highly selective in the symptoms or impairments they feign. Astute or informed feigners will even limit their complaints to specific signs and symptoms of a particular disorder or disability. It is therefore essential that symptom validity assessment includes multiple measures covering diverse domains of symptomatology during various stages of the evaluation (Boone, 2009; Heilbronner et al., 2009).

Even though the SIMS taps into several areas of psychopathology, it is advisable to combine it with other SVTs, preferably PVTs, which tap underperformance, a dimension that is relatively independent of symptom over-reporting as indexed by the SIMS (Nelson, Sweet, Berry, Bryant, & Granacher, 2007; Ruocco et al., 2008; see also Table 5). Precisely because PVTs aim at another dimension of symptom validity testing, they are susceptible to other error sources than the SIMS (Dandachi-FitzGerald et al., 2011; Green et al., 2012).

Using the SIMS in conjunction with other validity tests allows for a significant reduction in false-positive risk; namely, through adherence to the rule that a respondent has to fail at least two validity tests in order to be classified as a feignor (Giger et al., 2010). Clinicians and researchers who decide to employ the SIMS are well-advised to bear this rule, also known as the two-failure rule (Victor et al., 2009), in mind. Concerns that the efficacy of the two-failure rule diminishes when more than two validity tests are administered (Berthelson, Mulchan, Odland, Miller, & Mittenberg, 2013) are dispelled by recent empirical findings (Davis & Millis, 2014; Larrabee, 2014).

Because its administration is simple and brief, the SIMS is a fair candidate for inclusion in a multi-method approach to symptom validity assessment. The original cut scores of the SIMS yield substandard specificity, which renders them inappropriate for confirming suspicious scores on other validity tests. On the other hand, the sensitivity of these cutoffs is relatively high. This makes them more suitable to rule feigning out, rather than rule it in. Hence, when using its original cutoffs, the SIMS is best used as first instrument in a multi-method approach. An advantage of using the SIMS as primary screen is that its subscales may provide an indication of the type of psychopathology a respondent might feign, which could facilitate the selection of validity tests that are tailored to specific (pseudo)psychopathology.
Alternatives

Further proliferation of the SIMS comes with two risks. The first is that information about its cutoffs may become so prevalent that well-informed and calculating respondents will adapt their test behavior in order to pass the SIMS. It is true that the SIMS is presently robust against coaching. However, there might come a time when potential respondents can educate themselves (e.g., through the Internet; see Bauer & McCaffrey, 2006; Ruiz, Drake, Glass, Marcotte, & van Gorp, 2002) on how to feign psychiatric complaints while evading detection when confronted with the SIMS (for a recent example, see the Wikipedia entry on the TOMM). 5

A second risk is that widespread use of the SIMS can lead to a form of thoughtless routine on the part of clinicians. Sociologists have termed this phenomenon the performance paradox (van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). It arises when examinees have learned to mask inferior performance by adjusting their response to performance indicators such that they obtain superior test results (Meyer & Gupta, 1994). A similar scenario might unfold with instruments such as the SIMS. That is, respondents may come to learn how to obscure a sophisticated form of feigning by scoring reassuringly low on the SIMS.

Thus, the adequate sensitivity of the SIMS with cut scores of up to > 16 is not likely to last forever. Bearing this in mind, it is sensible to consider alternatives to the SIMS. One candidate is the M Test (Beaber, Marston, Michelli, & Mills, 1985; for reviews, see Boone, 2013, or Smith, 2008). The M Test is a 25-item self-report measure with a dichotomous response format that contains genuine symptoms of schizophrenia as well as absurd beliefs and bogus symptoms. The M Test focuses on feigned schizophrenia and is hence ill-suited to assess other types of feigned psychopathology. Nevertheless, the M Test might be valuable in a forensic context where blatant forms of feigning can be expected. In a direct comparison of their sensitivities, the M Test outperformed the SIMS in a sample of defendants suspected of feigning incompetence to stand trial, with detection rates being .93 and .87, respectively (Heinze & Purisch, 2001). However, in samples where the psychopathology that respondents attempt to feign is relatively mild, the diagnostic qualities of the M Test are less satisfactory, especially with regard to specificity (Boone, 2013).

Another alternative is the Miller-Forensic Assessment of Symptoms Test (M-FAST; Miller, 2001; see also Smith, 2008). The M-FAST is a 25-item structured interview that (much like the vastly more extensive SIRS) probes into unusual and implausible symptomatology. In a known-groups comparison—with the SIRS serving as external criterion—of patients involved in competency to stand trial evaluations, the M-FAST held its ground as firmly as the SIMS did, producing very large effect sizes ($d_{M-FAST}: 2.7$, $d_{SIMS}: 3.1$; Vitacco et al., 2007). Similar effects were attained in a sample of claimants of personal injury or workers’ compensation ($d_{M-FAST}: 3.0$, $d_{SIMS}: 2.6$; Alwes et al., 2008). The M-FAST might be a good alternative to the SIMS when patients or defendants have reading difficulties.

Of course, symptom validity assessment is not limited to freestanding screening measures such as the SIMS and the M-FAST. Obvious alternatives for comprehensive assessment of symptom validity include the SIRS, but also clinical inventories with

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embedded symptom validity scales (for a qualitative review, see Boone, 2013), such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 Restructured Form (MMPI-2-RF; Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2008) and the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI; Morey, 2007). A notable advantage of the SIMS over these more extensive instruments lies in its short administration time. As said before, however, the traditional cut scores of the SIMS are more suited to rule feigning out than to rule it in, while the cutoffs of these more comprehensive tools are geared toward the opposite.

**Conclusion**

In accordance with previous research, we found the SIMS to be a fairly sensitive test that is reasonably robust against coaching. A serious weakness of the SIMS is its poor specificity when the original cut scores (> 14 and > 16) are employed. These cutoffs are more effective in ruling feigning out than ruling it in, which is consistent with the SIMS’s status as a screen for feigned psychopathology. The substandard specificity of the original cut scores of the SIMS can be worked around by combining the SIMS with PVTs and other SVTs, and by raising the cut score, although the latter solution sacrifices sensitivity for specificity. Furthermore, we advise clinicians to adopt a position of respectful skepticism toward respondents with a heightened SIMS score. Although an assumption of honesty might be naïve in, for example, a forensic context, the burden of proof for the conclusion that an individual feigns symptoms rests on the shoulders of diagnostic experts. A deviant SIMS score alone does not meet the burden of proof, but it should be an impetus for follow-up investigation.

**REFERENCES**

References marked with an asterisk indicate studies included in Table 6.


* Merten, T., Lorenz, R., & Schlatow, S. (2010). Posttraumatic Stress Disorder can easily be faked, but faking can be detected in most cases. German Journal of Psychiatry, 13, 140–149.


